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Let the Burden Fit the Crime: Extending
Proportionality Review to Sex Offenders
Draconian restrictions on the activities and privacy of convicted sex
offenders are a new, and troublesome, trend. In 1994 and 20o6, following a
national dialogue about crimes against children sparked by several high-profile
incidents, Congress passed two laws requiring states to register and regulate
sex offenders residing within their borders.' States and municipalities soon
caught on, and deepened restrictions. In the last five years alone, local
governments have forbidden sex offenders to live within 2,000 feet of schools;2
"be" within 500 feet of parks or movie theaters;' enter public libraries;4 drive
buses or taxis;5 photograph or film minors;6 and use social networking
websites like Facebook.7 Others have required sex offenders to advertise their
1. See Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 109-248, §§ 101-31, 120 Stat.
587, 590-601 (20o6) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §5 16901-29); Jacob Wetterling Crimes
Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 5 170101, 108 Stat.
1796, 2038-42 (1994), repealed by Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act
5 129, 120 Stat. at 6oo.
2. See IOWA CODE ANN. 5 692A.114 (West 2009) (imposing this restriction on sex offenders
who have committed an aggravated offense against a minor).
3. See NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. 5 213-1243(4) (West 2009) (imposing this restriction on "Tier 3"
sex offenders who lack the permission of their "parole and probation officer").
4. See Doe v. City of Albuquerque, 667 F.3d ii (loth Cit. 2012) (striking down on First
Amendment grounds a 20o8 Albuquerque "administrative instruction" that banned
registered sex offenders from using public libraries).
5. LA. Rrv. STAT. ANN. 15:5 53 (A) (2012).
6. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 17.546(3) (West 2013).
7. Id. § 17.546; N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. 5 14-202.5 (West 2009) (imposing this restriction on
those convicted of sexually violent offenses or crimes against children).
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status on driver's licenses' or social networking profiles; 9 wear GPS bracelets at
their own expense;o notify local police when present in any county within the
state for longer than ten days;- provide notice to all new neighbors within a
roughly quarter-mile radius when they move;" and pay up to $100 annually to
maintain sex offender registries. 3 These burdens typically last for a decade or
for life, depending on the jurisdiction and the type of crime committed. 4
Some sex offender restrictions (SORs) can be harder to comply with than
is apparent at first glance. Residency restrictions, for example, can create
overlapping forbidden zones that bar sex offenders from living in entire cities.'s
A few years ago in Miami, sex offenders were known to camp under a bridge,
one of few locations outside all exclusion zones." Violating these restrictions
can result in a felony conviction and as many as ten years in prison. 7
8. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:412(I) (1) (2013).
9. Id. § 15:542.1(D) (1).
10. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3 oo4 (b)-(c) (West 2011).
in. Aluz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-3821(A) (2012).
12. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:542.1(A)(1)(a) (2012).
13. Wis. STAT. § 301.45(10) (2012). Several of these statutes were enjoined on constitutional
reasoning that the Supreme Court, as explained later in the Comment, might find dubious.
See, e.g., Doe v. Raemisch, 895 F. Supp. 2d 897 (E.D. Wis. 2012) (holding that a $ioo
annual fee on sex offenders violates the Ex Post Facto Clause); ACLU of Nev. v. Cortez
Masto, 719 F. Supp. 2d 1258 (D. Nev. 2oo8) (holding that the retroactive application of
residency and other restrictions violates the Ex Post Facto, Double Jeopardy, and Due
Process Clauses of the Constitution). Other restrictions limiting sex offenders' free
expression have been overturned as violations of the First Amendment. See, e.g., Doe v. City
of Albuquerque, 667 F-3d l111 (loth Cir. 2012) (striking down a city ban on sex offenders'
use of public libraries); Doe v. Jindal, 853 F. Supp. 2d 596 (M.D. La. 2012) (enjoining a state
ban on sex offenders' use of social networking sites as facially overbroad and a violation of
their First Amendment rights); State v. Packingham, 748 S.E.2d 146 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013)
(invalidating a similar North Carolina ban on sex offenders' use of social networking sites
for vagueness and for violating the First Amendment).
14. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 692A.1o6 (2013) (ten years by default, life for "sexually violent
predator[s]"); NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-4005 (2010) (fifteen years, twenty-five years, or life,
depending on the crime).
15. See Corey Rayburn Yung, Banishment by a Thousand Laws: Residency Restrictions on Sex
Offenders, 85 WASH. U. L. REv. 101, 104 (2007).
16. Greg Allen, Sex Offenders Forced to Live Under Miami Bridge, NPR, May 20, 2009,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=104150499.
17. For example, a first-time registration violation in Louisiana bears a penalty of two to ten
years in prison. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:542.1.4 (2012). Failing to register in Missouri is a
Class D felony for a first offense. Mo. REv. STAT. § 589.425 (2011).
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Legislators often justify SORs on the grounds of preventing recidivism and
see child molesters as the main targets." The theory is that if the public is
notified of dangerous past offenders in their neighborhood, and those
offenders are barred from entering public areas frequented by vulnerable
persons, then future sexual assaults can be prevented. The argument seems to
be persuasive to much of the public, for SORs are popular with constituents. 9
Yet very few sex offenders- including child molesters-are recidivists. 20 Of
those convicted of offenses against children, even fewer pose threats to the
public at large because victims are often a member of the offender's own
family.
These restrictions often indiscriminately reach all sex offenders, irrespective
of their dangerousness. Many SORs apply to first-time offenders and those
convicted of minor offenses.2 2 An eighteen-year-old who had consensual sex
,8. E.g., 151 CONG. REC. 7,394 (2005) (statement of Rep. Mark Foley) ("There is a ninety
percent likelihood of recidivism for sexual crimes against children."); 142 CONG. REc. 10,312
(1996) (statement of Rep. Charles Schumer) ("[W]hen these folks come out of prison, the
odds are extremely high that they will commit the same or a similar crime again."); 140
CONG. REC. 22,520 (1994) (statement of Rep. Jennifer Dunn) ("The rate of recidivism for
these crimes is astronomical because these people are compulsive."); 139 CONG. REC. 30,580
(1993) (statement of Sen. Joseph Biden) ("[T]hese offenders are a group especially prone to
recidivism."); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. 5 14-208.5 (2012) ("The General Assembly recognizes
that sex offenders often pose a high risk of engaging in sex offenses even after being released
from incarceration or commitment. . . ."); Proposition 83, CAL. SECRETARY ST. § 2(b) (20o6),
http://vote2o6.sos.ca.gov/voterguide/pdf/prop83_text.pdf (stating on the ballot for a sex
offender residency restriction that "[s]ex offenders have a dramatically higher recidivism
rate for their crimes than any other type of violent felon," that they "prey on the most
innocent members of our society," and that "[m]ore than two-thirds of the victims of rape
and sexual assault are under the age of 18").
19. Jill S. Levenson et al., Public Perceptions About Sex Offenders and Community Protection Policies,
7 ANALYSES Soc. ISSUES & PUB. POL'Y 1, 3-4 (2007) (surveying local American and British
polls showing majority support for community notification laws).
20. An FBI study found that only 3.5% of nearly 1o,ooo sex offenders released in 1994 were
reconvicted for a new sex offense within three years of release from prison; the numbers for
rapists, sexual assaulters, and child molesters were 3.2%, 3.7%, and 3.5%, respectively.
Patrick A. Langan et al., Recidivism of Sex Offenders Released from Prison in 1994, BUREAU
JUST. STAT. 24 (2003), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/rsorp94.pdf.
21. Among the victims of sexual assaulters serving their sentences in state prison in 1997,
roughly 46.5% were assaulted by members of their own family; only 6.7% were strangers to
their assaulter. Id. at 36.
22. See, e.g., Sex Laws: Unjust and Ineffective, ECONOMIST, Aug. 6, 2009, http://www.economist
.com/node/14164614 (reporting that, as of publication, twenty-nine states registered
teenagers who are designated as sex offenders for having consensual sex with another
teenager).
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with his sixteen-year-old girlfriend and was convicted of statutory rape in
Arizona could be required to register as a sex offender, depending only on his
and her exact birth dates. Or someone convicted of urinating in public in
California today might be forced to live in an isolated corner of Sacramento.2 4
SOR statutes, however carelessly drawn, largely evade constitutional
checks. They ordinarily meet the rational basis test, for legislators can always
allege that sex offenders pose some threat of recidivism, and that restricting
their movements or privacy reduces the threat, even when they fail to target the
sex offenders who pose an actual danger. Courts have condoned SOR statutes
under rational-basis review even when legislators acted on erroneous
information about recidivism rates among sex offenders. And the Supreme
Court has explicitly limited other constitutional review of SORs. In Smith v.
Doe, the Court held that community notification laws for sex offenders do not
violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because post-sentence restrictions on sex
offenders are "civil" rather than "criminal." 1 6 Presumably this means SORs
cannot be reviewed under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment 7 or Double
Jeopardy Clauses, either. Because SORs typically enroll sex offenders
automatically based on prior convictions at trial, the Court held in a companion
case to Smith that the Due Process Clauses do not require the government to
hold individualized hearings to determine whether an offender should be
subject to SORs.
The lack of constitutional checks might be surprising given that courts
review some civil sanctions for "proportionality" with the underlying
wrongdoing under the Due Process Clauses. In the landmark case BMW of
23. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-3821(A)(4), 13-1 4 05(A) (201o). A defense is available to
individuals who are under nineteen and accused of sexual misconduct based on consensual
sex with a partner who was fifteen, sixteen, or seventeen, but only if the age difference
between the two sexual partners is no more than twenty-four months. Id. § 13-1407(F).
24. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 314(1)-(2), 290(c) (West 2oo8).
25. Compare Conn. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 4 (2003) ("[W]hen convicted sex
offenders reenter society, they are much more likely than any other type of offender to be re-
arrested for a new rape or sexual assault." (quoting McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 32-33
(2002))), with Raised on the Registry: The Irreparable Harm ofPlacing Children on Sex Offender
Registries in the US, HUM. RTs. WATCH 4 (May 2013), http://www.hrw.org/sites/default
/files/reports/uso53_ForUpload i.pdf (reciting a recidivism rate for all offenses of 4o%, for
adult sex offenders of 13%, and for juvenile sex offenders of 4 -10%).
26. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 1o5-o6 (2003).
27. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 95-96 (1958).
28. Conn. Dep't ofPub. Safety, 538 U.S. 1.
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North America, Inc. v. Gore,29 the Supreme Court invalidated a punitive damage
award in a civil lawsuit as "grossly excessive" compared to the injury done."o
The Court developed three "guideposts" for assessing proportionality that
resemble the factors in cruel-and-unusual-punishment analysis under the
Eighth Amendment.31
This Comment argues that the justifications the Court appealed to in the
punitive damages context militate with equal or greater force for a comparable
requirement for SORs, and then proceeds to show that the test the BMW
Court outlined easily translates into the SOR context. While scholars have
proposed constitutional review of SORs under doctrines other than the one
articulated in this Comment, proportionality offers unique advantages. Unlike
review under the Ex Post Facto Clause"2 or Eighth Amendment,33
proportionality does not flout Smith's judgment that SORs are civil
regulations. Unlike review for violation of particular constitutional liberties,
such as free speech, 4 proportionality can be used to review all SORs, not just
29. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
3o. Id. at 568 (quoting TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 456 (1993)).
31. Id. at 574-85. Here, the Court developed a list of proportionality factors strikingly similar to
those used in the criminal sentencing context. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292 (1983)
(naming as guiding criteria for Eighth Amendment proportionality analysis "(i) the gravity
of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other
criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of the
same crime in other jurisdictions").
32. See, e.g., Catherine L. Carpenter & Amy E. Beverlin, The Evolution of Unconstitutionality in
Sex Offender Registration Laws, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1071, 1076 (2012) (arguing that a "serially
amended" sex offender statute might be classified as "punitive"); Brian P. LiVecchi, "The
Least of These:" A Constitutional Challenge to North Carolina's Sexual Offender Laws and N. C.
Gen. Stat. 514-208.18, 33 N.C. CENT. L. REv. 53, 74-75 (2010) ("These very recent cases may
be suggestive of a trend in courts finally reaching a breaking point when it comes to ex post
facto registration requirements.").
33. See, e.g., Elizabeth P. Bruns, Comment, Cruel and Unusual?: Virginia's New Sex Offender
Registration Statute, 2 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 171 (1995); Rebecca Shepard, Note, Does
the Punishment Fit the Crime?: Applying Eighth Amendment Proportionality Analysis to Georgia's
Sex Offender Registration Statute and Residency and Employment Restrictions for Juvenile
Offenders, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 529 (2012); Emily J. Stine, Comment, When Yes Means No,
Legally: An Eighth Amendment Challenge to Classifying Consenting Teenagers as Sex Offenders,
6o DEPAUL L. REv. 1169 (2oi).
34. See, e.g., Jasmine S. Wynton, Note, Myspace, Yourspace, but Not Theirspace: The
Constitutionality of Banning Sex Offenders from Social Networking Sites, 6o DuKE L.J. 1859
(2011) (arguing that networking-site restrictions violate the First Amendment unless they
are narrowly tailored).
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those that infringe particular substantive rights. Proportionality analysis also
drives to the heart of the problem with many recent SORs: that they target
more people, more harshly, than is necessary to achieve their objectives. It
could therefore go a long way toward curbing SORs of great severity or
duration that are imposed indiscriminately on many or all categories of sex
offenders, including those convicted of non-violent crimes.
1. PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Courts review criminal punishments under the Eighth Amendment for
proportionality, meaning that punishments must bear some reasonable
relationship to the crimes that trigger them.35 While early twentieth-century
precedents hinted that due process requires civil penalties, too, to be
proportionate, the Court did not invalidate a single civil damages award for
disproportionality from the Lochner era until 1996.6 Due process regulated
only the procedures used to deprive a person of life, liberty, or property,
imposing no substantive limit on the amount of that deprivation.
The early hint that proportionality might be a "substantive" due process
right was confirmed in 1993 in TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.,
when a plurality of the Court extended proportionality review to punitive
damages. Punitive damages may be imposed in civil lawsuits, in addition to
compensatory damages, to further state interests in punishment and
deterrence." Generally they are available only for reckless, malicious, or
35. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 365-67, 378-79, 381 (1910).
36. See St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63, 66-67 (1919) (finding the penalty
at issue not excessive); Sw. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Danaher, 238 U.S. 482, 490-91 (1915) (finding
the penalty excessive); Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U.S. 86, 111-12 (1909) (finding
the penalty not excessive); see also TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443,
479 (1993) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing no cases later than these for the application of
proportionality review to punitive damages); Gore, 517 U.S. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(explaining that the majority's opinion invalidated a state-court punitive damages award as
excessive for the first time in the Court's history); Robert E. Riggs, Constitutionalizing
Punitive Damages: The Limits ofDue Process, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 859, 870-71 (1991).
37. 509 U.S. at 453-58 (plurality opinion). The Court had also suggested earlier, in Pacific
Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, that excessive punitive damages awards might be subject
to due process limits. 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991) ("[U]nlimited jury discretion-or unlimited
judicial discretion for that matter-in the fixing of punitive damages may invite extreme
results that jar one's constitutional sensibilities.").
38. Gore, 517 U.S. at 568.
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oppressive conduct.39 TXO established that a punitive damages award violates
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause if it is "grossly excessive"
relative to the state's legitimate purposes. 4o The Court has not applied due
process proportionality to any other civil penalty.4'
When the Court first overturned a punitive damages award as "grossly
excessive," in Gore in 1996, it articulated three "guideposts" for excessiveness:
the reprehensibility of the conduct; the disparity between the punitive and
compensatory damages; and the difference between the punitive damages and
other civil penalties for similar misconduct, in the same or other jurisdictions.42
This review is stricter than rational basis but falls short of heightened
scrutiny.4 Using the Gore factors, the Court has invalidated punitive damages
with ratios to compensatory damages of 5oo:1+ and 145:1.4s In 2003, the Court
refined the test into a near-categorical principle: "few awards exceeding a
single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant
degree, will satisfy due process."46
The Court has offered several justifications, express and implied, for
applying proportionality review to punitive damages. On the cursory reasoning
of the early 1900s civil proportionality cases, cited by Gore, deprivations of
property that are "plainly arbitrary and oppressive"47 or "grossly excessive"48
compared to what is required to achieve any government purpose are
presumably issued without due process. In and since Gore, the Court has
identified specific features of punitive damages that raise special due process
concerns triggering proportionality review: they (1) may not give fair notice to
39. 9TH CIR. MANUAL OF MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL § 5.5 (2007).
40. 509 U.S. at 458 (plurality opinion). A majority of the Court agreed that due process
requirements apply to punitive damages. Id. at 466 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 471
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
41. Cf United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998) (applying proportionality analysis under
the Excessive Fines Clause to a civil forfeiture of property); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S.
374 (1994) (applying "rough proportionality" under the Takings Clause to conditions placed
by a city on the development of commercial land).
42. 517 U.S. at 574-75.
43. TXO, 509 U.S. at 456.
44. Gore, 517 U.S. at 582.
45. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 412 (2003).
46. Id. at 425.
47. Sw. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Danaher, 238 U.S. 482, 491 (1915).
48. Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U.S. 86, 111 (1909).
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potential offenders of the penalties for their conduct; (2) are imposed through
an adjudication designed for a different purpose; and (3) are imposed with so
much discretion and against such disfavored groups that the risk of arbitrary
enforcement is high. Additionally, while the Court has not expressly observed
it, a fourth feature unites punitive damages with other sanctions reviewed for
proportionality under other constitutional provisions: they serve to punish, a
function that implicates traditional retributive limiting principles like
proportionality.
II. THE PARALLEL BETWEEN PUNITIVE DAMAGES AND SEX
OFFENDER RESTRICTIONS
The four justifications listed above for applying a proportionality principle
to punitive damages can readily be applied in other contexts. Below, I elaborate
on these justifications and explain how they apply with equal or greater force to
SORs. Conveniently, a 2003 opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist suggests that a
"substantive due process" challenge to SORs remains open.49
First, both punitive damages and SORs raise concerns about adequate
notice. The Court's primary reason for imposing a proportionality requirement
in Gore was that, without it, potential offenders would lack "fair notice" of the
legal consequences of their conduct. 0 Under fair notice doctrine, due process
demands that the law state explicitly and precisely what conduct is forbidden.'
But the Court has gone further in punitive damages cases, observing in Gore
that "[e]lementary notions of fairness enshrined in our constitutional
jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair notice not only of the conduct
49. Conn. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 8 (2003) (stating that a state's classification of
dangerous and non-dangerous sex offenders alike "'must ultimately be analyzed' in terms of
substantive, not procedural, due process," and declining to express an opinion on whether
the community notification law "violates principles of substantive due process" (quoting
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 121 (1989))); see also id. at 9 (Souter, J., concurring).
The argument that the plaintiff raised in Doe was that he was entitled to a hearing on his
dangerousness, because his inclusion in a public registry effectively branded him as
dangerous. Id. at 6. While Chief Justice Rehnquist may not have meant that Doe could
make a substantive due process argument based on proportionality, his observation reveals
that the Court did not see its opinions in Doe and Smith as decisively settling the
constitutional controversy over SORs.
so. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 (1995); see also Campbell, 538 U.S. at 417
(quoting the same language from Gore).
Si. See, e.g., FCC v. Fox Television Stations, 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2317 (2012) (civil law); Connally v.
Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (criminal law).
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that will subject him to punishment, but also of the severity of the penalty that
a State may impose."" Amounts of punitive damages will be hard for a
tortfeasor to predict, because-absent proportionality- those damages need
not be anchored to any reasonably knowable facts, like the actual or foreseeable
injury caused. Often juries may calculate punitive damages to deter future
misconduct not just by the tortfeasor on trial, but also by other potential
defendants, about whom the tortfeasor will ordinarily lack information.
SORs may create an even greater fair notice problem than punitive
damages, because SORs are harder to predict. A prospective offender should be
able to roughly determine the criminal sentences he could face," but he can
only guess about SORs yet to be enacted. Legislatures may restrict new
liberties of sex offenders long after their crimes and even after their prison
sentences, 4 and across many different aspects of their lives; legislators are
growing more creative. For those convicted of minor sex offenses-such as
teenagers convicted under harsh statutory rape laws - SORs may be worse than
their criminal sentence of a few months in prison. If we take seriously the fair
notice logic of Gore, SORs should have some limiting principle so that
potential sex offenders -like tortfeasors-can predict the range of legal
consequences that could result from their misconduct. Proportionality would
provide that limiting principle.
The principle that criminal defendants should have notice of civil as well as
criminal consequences of their crimes is already implicit in the Court's
jurisprudence. Padilla v. Kentucky recently held that criminal defendants
engaged in plea bargaining have a constitutional right to be informed by
counsel that a conviction might result in the civil consequence of deportation,
in part because of recent expansions in deportation-eligible offenses.5
Admittedly, pleading guilty is a different decision than committing the crime,
the decision with which fair notice doctrine is concerned. But Padilla implies
that a person considering committing or admitting to a crime may find the
legal consequences of that crime relevant, regardless of their classification as
civil or criminal, because of the hardship they would inflict on that person.
52. 517 U.S. at 574.
53. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines, case law, and statutory maximum penalties all provide
guidance.
54. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003) (holding that sex offender registration does not violate the
Ex Post Facto Clause because it is nonpunitive).
55. 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
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Second, both punitive damages and SORs are imposed as a result of an ill-
fitting process. The trial deemed "due process" for imposing each sanction is
designed to make a factual determination different than the one that justifies
imposing the sanction. A civil jury is primarily tasked with deciding questions
of duties, causation, and valuation. Awarding punitive damages is a task more
akin to penal policy-setting: how much money is necessary to punish the
defendant, and to deter his and others' misconduct?"6 Yet, because liability and
compensation are a trial's focus, the jury may not receive evidence about the
amount of punitive damages needed to meet these policy objectives. 7 Often the
only relevant evidence presented at trial concerns the defendant's mens rea, a
precondition for punitive damages. As the Court explained in a punitive
damages case, "evidence of culpability warranting some punishment is not a
substitute for evidence providing at least a rational basis for the particular
deprivation of property imposed by the State to deter future wrongdoing.""
The mismatch between SORs and their "due process" is greater. Almost all
sex offender restrictions are justified by state legislatures as preventing crime,
or allaying community fear of it." Legislators often cite the erroneous but
common belief that sex offenders have higher recidivism rates than other types
of criminals.6 o Many SORs primarily aim to protect children against this
recidivism. The major pieces of federal legislation that enact SORs are the
Jacob Wetterling Act and the Adam Walsh Act, both named after child victims
of violent crime.6 1 Yet a trial for a sex offense is a poor process for determining
whether a sex offender is a future danger to anyone -much less a danger to
children in particular. Juries are not asked to determine whether defendants are
likely to re-offend, or against whom. The Court itself admitted this inadequacy
of trials, suggesting that an SOR statute that imposes a severe restriction and
56. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 19 (1991) ("[P]unitive damages are imposed
for purposes of retribution and deterrence." (citing Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 470 So. 2d
lo6o, 1076 (Ala. 1984))).
57. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 418 (2003) ("Our concerns
are heightened when the decisionmaker is presented ... with evidence that has little bearing
as to the amount of punitive damages that should be awarded."); see also Gore, 517 U.S. at
573 (noting the inadequacy of the evidence presented to the jury for assessing punitive
damages).
58. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 429 (1994).
s9. See, e.g., Mary Ann Farkas & Amy Stichman, Sex Offender Laws: Can Treatment, Punishment,
Incapacitation, and Public Safety Be Reconciled?, 27 CluM. JUST. REV. 256, 257 (2002).
6o. See Raised on the Registry, supra note 25, at 4.
61. Carpenter & Beverlin, supra note 32, at 1076-78.
1616
123: 1607 2014
LET THE BURDEN FIT THE CRIME
acknowledges an aim to incapacitate "particularly dangerous" offenders might,
to satisfy due process, need an additional individualized adjudication of
dangerousness.2 This is a strange twist of logic, implying that a less
transparent legislature that relies on generalizations or even false information
that all sex offenders pose a future danger-and therefore that fails to isolate
"particularly" dangerous offenders as its target-may be effectively insulated
from a due process challenge.
Third, the wide discretion given juries in imposing punitive damages
creates an unusual risk of arbitrary and prejudicial enforcement.63 The Court
sees the disfavored and vulnerable group as big business, whose deep pockets
may be tempting targets for outsized punitive damages.'4 The Court has
interpreted disproportionate awards as evidence of such prejudice.6 s But big
business is hardly a singularly vulnerable group. Sex offenders are more
unpopular, and their unpopularity is often based on untenable assumptions
about their crimes, their psychology, or their future danger." Legislators
pressured to be tough on crime face few drawbacks but many rewards for
restricting released sex offenders. Like juries determining punitive damages,
legislators operate mostly unchecked in passing SORs; for example, they may
pass them retroactively and with no process beyond the original trial. This
combination of legislative discretion and offender vulnerability may have
contributed to the spate of carelessly drawn SORs that sweep in minor and
serious sex offenders alike.
Fourth, SORs can be sufficiently punitive in nature to invoke
proportionality as a traditional retributive limiting principle of punishment. If
one characteristic unites most types of sanctions -both criminal and civil 6 7 - to
which the Court has applied constitutional proportionality review, it is their
punitive nature. In addition to punitive damages and punishment itself, the
Court has applied proportionality to "punitive" forfeitures under the Excessive
62. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 104 (2003).
63. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 417 (2003) ("Jury instructions
typically leave the jury with wide discretion in choosing amounts, and the presentation of
evidence of a defendant's net worth creates the potential that juries will use their verdicts to
express biases against big businesses, particularly those without strong local presences."
(quoting Honda Motor Co., 512 U.S. at 432 )).
64. See id. at 417,427-28; TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 462 (1993).
65. See Campbell, 538 U.S. at 417, 426-28; TXO, 509 U.S. at 462.
66. See Raised on the Registry, supra note 25, at 4, 6-7.
67. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447-48 (1989).
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Fines Clause.68 Proportionality as a retributive limiting principle on the
severity of punishment means that, regardless of the state's penal aims, it
cannot dole out its punishment to an offender except in proportion to his
actual wrongdoing. For example, though deterrence may be a penal aim, it is
limited in any given case by proportionality.69 To the extent SORs are
punitive, they should be subject to retributive proportionality.
The Court evaluates whether a sanction is "punitive" using the Kennedy v.
Mendoza-Martinez factors. 7o These are neither exhaustive nor definitive, but in
examining Alaska's sex offender registration and community-notification laws
in 2003, the Court stressed the question "whether, in its necessary operation,
the regulatory scheme: has been regarded in our history and traditions as a
punishment; imposes an affirmative disability or restraint; promotes the
traditional aims of punishment; has a rational connection to a nonpunitive
purpose; or is excessive with respect to this purpose." 1 Applying these factors,
the Court found Alaska's scheme nonpunitive. But the Court's analysis
emphasized the "minor and indirect" nature of the "disability or restraint,"
which left sex offenders "free to move where they wish and to live and work as
other citizens, with no supervision."72 Compared to the current infringements
of privacy and mobility that sex offenders face, the Alaskan scheme was mild.73
If we accept that an SOR imposes an "affirmative disability or restraint,"
then the key remaining Mendoza-Martinez factors will be whether the SOR has
been traditionally regarded as a punishment, and whether it rationally serves a
punitive purpose or is excessive vis-i-vis its nonpunitive purpose. As other
68. United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998) (holding that punitive forfeiture violates the
Excessive Fines Clause if grossly disproportional to a defendant's offense); see also Michael J.
Wishnie, Immigration Law and the Proportionality Requirement, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 415,
425-35 (2012) (arguing that immigration removal orders and re-entry bars are punitive and
subject to proportionality review). But see Dolan v. Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) (requiring
proportionality for a nonpunitive taking).
69. H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 9 (1968); see also Emad H. Atiq, How Folk
Beliefs About Free Will Influence Sentencing: A New Target for the Neuro-Determinist Critics of
Criminal Law, 16 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 449, 468 (2013) (explaining how prevailing moral
theories and practice endorse proportionality as a limitation on just punishment).
70. 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963).
71. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 97 (2003).
72. Id. at loo-o.
73. The Alaska scheme required offenders to contribute personal information to a state registry
and verify the information periodically, annually for fifteen years, or quarterly for life
depending on the type and number of offenses; the offenders' names, photos, addresses,
places of employment, and other information were published online. Id. at 90-91.
1618
123:16 07 2014
LET THE BURDEN FIT THE CRIME
scholars have discussed, the types of disabilities imposed by SORs- including
near-banishment and other social exclusion-have historically been used to
punish in the United States.74 Perhaps authorities will argue that their SORs
serve public-safety purposes, not punitive purposes. Excess should constitute
strong evidence of at least a partial punitive purpose, for the excess will be
harder to justify on grounds other than the "traditional aims of punishment,"
retribution and deterrence. SORs may be punitive only in certain cases, for "a
civil as well as a criminal sanction constitutes punishment when the sanction as
applied in the individual case serves the goals of punishment."5 This would be
the case, for example, where the SOR applies to all sex offenders even though
the regulatory purpose implicates only a subset of offenders. That an SOR, as
applied, is sufficiently punitive to require proportionality review -itself merely
a test, not a conclusion -does not mean it will be deemed punishment subject
to other constitutional restraints.
As an example, residency restrictions that, banishment-like, all but exclude
sex offenders from living in a city should be found punitive. These restrictions
ban sex offenders from living within a certain distance- typically i,ooo to
2,000 feet-of a school, park, or other facility frequented by children. Given
the density of children's facilities, this restriction often effectively banishes sex
offenders from all city real estate. Banishment has a long history as a form of
punishment in the United States. 6 Ostensibly, residency restrictions serve the
nonpunitive purpose of keeping children safe from sexual predators. Yet they
typically apply to many sex offenders other than those who have assaulted
children. Banishing a person who streaked as a high school student77 is
excessively burdensome given that it does nothing to protect children but
imposes a heavy cost on the delinquent minor. When a law like this fails to
achieve its safety objective in many individual cases, the only conceivable
objective it serves in those cases is punitive. It is retributive, inflicting suffering
on a person who has inflicted suffering on others; and its severity may deter, if
sex offenders are aware that their acts could gravely disrupt their lives even
after they have served their sentences.
74. See Yung, supra note 15, at 112-19. While the Court in Smith explained that registration and
notification requirements, alone, do not rise to the historic level of shaming punishments,
many other SORs will. See Smith, 538 U.S. at 97-99.
75. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989).
76. Yung, supra note 15, at 112-19.
77. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 314 (West 2008) (indecent exposure); CAL. PENAL CODE S 3003.5(a)-
(b) (West 2011) (residency exclusion for lifetime sex registrants, including those convicted
of indecent exposure).
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A skeptic of my argument might contend that penalties issued by juries-
but not, as in the case of SORs, by legislatures -uniquely warrant due process
review for excessiveness.78 Distrust of juries appears to be a principal
motivation in the Court's proportionality review of punitive damages. But
distrust of all actors may be prudent, given the broader concerns underpinning
proportionality review. Fair notice, the primary justification for proportionality
review cited in Gore, is as important for legislative penalties as for those
imposed in civil trials. The other justifications, as I've explained above, apply in
both contexts. Indeed, several of the early twentieth-century cases hinting at
proportionality review for punitive damages involved statutorily set penalties.79
Moreover, it is simply not true that legislators command more deference than
juries. Juries are highly respected in the American judicial system, and their
pronouncements carry the enhanced due process guarantee of individualized
consideration. Jury verdicts are generally upheld if supported by any "legally
sufficient evidentiary basis,"so a standard of review hardly more demanding
than the rational basis sought in legislation.
Ill. APPLYING BMW V. GORE TO SEX OFFENDER RESTRICTIONS
While Gore's proportionality test was designed for punitive damages, it can
easily be adapted to the SOR context. To determine whether a deprivation of
liberty is proportionate, as due process requires, the Court should inquire
whether it is "grossly excessive" to achieve the legitimate state objectives of
punishment." To reiterate, the Gore "guideposts" for evaluating the
excessiveness of punitive damages are (1) the reprehensibility of the
misconduct, (2) the disparity between the punitive and actual damages awards,
and (3) the difference between the punitive damages and other sanctions for
like misconduct, in the same and other jurisdictions.
78. See Pamela S. Karlan, "Pricking the Lines": The Due Process Clause, Punitive Damages, and
Criminal Punishment, 88 MINN. L. REv. 88o (2004).
79. See St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63, 66-67 (1919) (holding not to be
excessive the amount of a penalty within a statutorily prescribed range); Missouri Pac. Ry.
Co. v. Tucker, 230 U.S. 340, 350-51 (1913) (holding to be excessive the amount of a statutory
liquidated damages penalty for violating maximum-rate regulation); Waters-Pierce Oil Co.
v. Texas, 212 U.S. 86, ill (1909) (holding statutory penalties not to be excessive).
So. FED. R. Cv. P. 5o(a)(1).
Si. As a preliminary matter, courts will want to determine whether an SOR constitutes a
deprivation of liberty or property-a question unnecessary for punitive damages, because
money damages are clear property deprivations.
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The first factor cleanly translates to the SOR context: where Gore examines
reprehensibility of the misconduct, a court reviewing an SOR examines
reprehensibility of the sex crime. This factor should cast suspicion on statutes
that severely penalize petty criminals, such as public urinators, or that penalize
minors for life."
The second factor presents the greater challenge, for Gore compares the
monetary value of harm the defendant actually or potentially inflicted with the
money he may be forced to pay as punishment. The items compared are pre-
quantified for the court. For SORs, the court must instead compare the harm
that the sex crime inflicted on society with the harm that society may inflict in
return. This will require quantification of harm, but courts are well-acquainted
with this sort of analysis as part of their sentencing function," and anyway it
surely would not prevent detection of extreme disparities.
Where an SOR is triggered by any sex crime conviction,* the second factor
also might require aggregation that is not necessary for punitive damages: the
court should consider all of the crimes of the repeat offender; and, for
consistent logic, all of the restrictions imposed on the offender by states and
localities.5 This aggregation aligns with courts' approach to punitive damages,
which are often awarded in greater amounts where the defendant is more likely
to recidivate or has already recidivated. 6 Moreover, the interactive effects of
these restrictions may need to be examined. For example, where overlapping
residency exclusion zones exclude an offender from living in most parts of a
city, that effect should be considered in the calculus.
The third factor translates nearly as cleanly as the first. Rather than looking
merely to the severity of other sanctions for comparable misconduct, the court
82. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (200S) (observing the reduced reprehensibility of
juvenile misconduct).
83. Cf Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292 (1983) ("Application of [sentencing proportionality]
factors assumes that courts are competent to judge the gravity of an offense, at least on a
relative scale. In a broad sense this assumption is justified, and courts traditionally have
made these judgments -just as legislatures must make them in the first instance.").
84. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE § 3004(b) (West 2011) (applying a residency exclusion to all
registered sex offenders), with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-202.5(a) (2012) (applying social
networking restrictions only to those convicted of sexually violent offenses or crimes against
children).
8s. By contrast, where the SOR is triggered by a specific class of sex crime conviction, then
aggregation would only be necessary across the offender's convictions in that class.
86. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 423 (2003) (discussing the
importance of "prior transgressions" in assessing punitive damages).
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can compare among jurisdictions both the scope and severity of civil
restrictions and criminal sentences for similar sex offenses. SORs might also be
compared to penalties imposed for non-sex offenses of a similar nature. For
example, SORs imposed on minors convicted under laws criminalizing sex
between minors might be compared to penalties imposed for other juvenile
offenses. This branch of the inquiry should undermine SORs drawn with an
unusual degree of carelessness or imprecision.
Finally, proportionality review of SORs should include an additional
factor: a comparison between the offender's crime and the state's purpose for
the SOR. In almost every case, the state's purpose will match the traditional
penal purposes of deterrence, incapacitation, retribution, and, less often,
rehabilitation. Wide disparities between the purpose and the type of offender
targeted should constitute strong evidence that a sanction is disproportionate.
Some SORs, though only slightly burdensome, may do little to nothing to
advance the state's purpose when applied to particular sex offenders, or to a
particular class of sex offenders. For example, regulations that restrict sex
offenders' access to areas frequented by children will do little to prevent child
predation when applied to offenders unlikely to victimize children -perhaps
such as those who have only ever victimized adults. While resembling rational
basis review, this analysis differs because it examines whether the law's general
justification holds as applied to this sex offender. The analysis would not
require legislatures to use least-restrictive means, but would only permit courts
to consider the overbroad scope of an SOR as one factor suggesting its gross
excess.
While this extra factor is not one of the Gore three, it finds grounding in
the Court's discussion of the second factor, comparing punitive and
compensatory damages, and in the Court's application of retributive limiting
principles to punitive sanctions. The Court emphasizes that excessive punitive
awards are arbitrary and fail to serve the state's punitive interest in retribution
or deterrence." Presumably, awards would not be excessive if their full amount
served both of the state's legitimate interests. The question of excess in the
punitive damages context is necessarily only a question of magnitude. For
SORs, however, the excess can take the form of suffering of an unwarranted
type. In rejecting the punitive damages award in Campbell, the Court observed:
"[A] more modest punishment for this reprehensible conduct could have
satisfied the State's legitimate objectives, and the [state] courts should have
87. Id. at 417.
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gone no further."" That is an excellent slogan for reviewing sex offender
restrictions for proportionality.
Let me close by offering a fairly typical sample case. Many cities in Texas
have passed ordinances restricting the areas in which registered sex offenders
may live. To take just one example, the city of Burleson's ordinance forbids any
sex offender required to register in Texas, whose victim was younger than
seventeen years old, to "establish a permanent residence or temporary
residence within looo feet of any defined premise where children commonly
gather, including a playground, school, day-care center, video arcade facility,
public or private youth center, park, or community swimming pool."'9 Given
the Texas registration scheme, the ordinance applies to, among others,
teenagers convicted of having consensual sex with other teenagers.90 An
eighteen-year-old still in high school could be convicted under Texas law for
having sex with his fourteen-year-old freshman girlfriend. As a result, he
might be banned for ten years from living in certain Texas cities with tight
residency restrictions and a high density of schools and public parks, like
Burleson. 9'
Under the Gore analysis, a court reviewing this law would (1) consider the
reprehensibility of the consensual sex in this case; (2) compare the harm
inflicted on society by that act to the severity of the sanction against the
offender; (3) compare the sanction against consensual sex between minors here
to other sanctions for the same infraction; and (4) determine whether the
sanction serves the purpose of protecting public safety, which was arguably the
purpose of the residency restriction.92 Such a court should conclude that
consensual sex between teenagers is one of the least reprehensible sex offenses,
88. Id. at 419-20.
8g. BURLESON, TEX., CITY CODE § 54-150 (2013), http://www.burlesontx.com/DocumentCenter
/View/6338.
go. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.o1(a)(2)(A), (c)(1), (e)(2) (West 2011) (defining the crime of
sexual assault to include sexual penetration of a minor under seventeen years old, where an
affirmative defense is that the victim was at least fourteen years old and the perpetrator was
no more than three years older than the victim); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
62.001(5) (A) (West 20o6) (making a violation of § 22.011 a registrable offense).
91. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 62.101 (requiring registration for ten years for
someone convicted under 5 22.011).
gz. Proposition 83, supra note 18, at 5 2(b) (stating on the ballot for a sex offender residency
restriction that "[i]t is the intent of the People in enacting this measure to help Californians
better protect themselves, their children, and their communities; it is not the intent of the
People to embarrass or harass persons convicted of sex offenses").
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insofar as it involves no violence or abuse, and inflicts minimal harm on
society. The decade-long residential exclusion of the SOR is a penalty far
exceeding the misdemeanor penalties in other jurisdictions for consensual sex
between young people three or fewer years apart in age.9" Indeed, many
jurisdictions do not outlaw similar acts at all.94 Finally, the penalty is ill-
designed to protect the public from sexual predators of young children, given
that teenagers who have consensual sex with a girlfriend or boyfriend do not
seem uniquely subject to sexual temptation by very young children from their
residential neighborhood.95 All factors support the conclusion that Burleson's
residency restriction, applied to this crime, is "grossly excessive" in violation of
due process.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's serious due process concerns about punitive damages
awards against large corporations- regarding fair notice and an ill-fitting,
potentially prejudiced implementation process - apply just as powerfully to
harsh civil regulations imposed on sex offenders after their criminal sentences.
And any procedural inadequacies promise to take a heavier human toll for sex
93. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.5(a) (20o8) (providing that sex with a minor who is not
more than three years younger or older than the perpetrator is a misdemeanor); LA. REV.
STAT. § 14:8o.1(A) (2012) (providing that a person age seventeen or older commits a
misdemeanor by having sex with a minor at least thirteen years old if the perpetrator is no
less than two but no more than four years older).
94. With so-called "Romeo and Juliet laws," many states exempt from prosecution for statutory
rape minors with an age difference less than four years, if the victim is at least thirteen or
fourteen. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 18- 3-4 02(d) (2013) (permitting statutory rape charges
only where the victim is younger than fifteen or the age difference between perpetrator and
victim is four years or more); N.Y. PENAL LAw 5 130.30 (McKinney 2009) (providing an
affirmative defense to statutory rape that the perpetrator was no more than four years older
than the victim); OR. REv. STAT. § 163-345 (2011) (providing an affirmative defense to
statutory rape that the perpetrator was less than three years older than the victim at the time
of the offense).
9s. The Burleson ordinance was passed with legislative findings that "the recidivism rate for
released sex offenders is significant, especially for those who commit their crimes against
children" and that "the proximity of sex offenders to schools or other facilities that might
create temptation to repeat offenses are one way to minimize risk of recidivism."
See Burleson, Tex., City Ordinance No. B-80 3-13 (Feb. 18, 2013), http://www.burlesontx
.com/DocumentCenter/View/6338. The ordinance also bans sex offenders from locations
that appear to be frequented by very young children, as opposed to high school students-
such as day-care centers, playgrounds, and parks. Id.
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offenders than they do for big business. This Comment has proposed a
straightforward doctrinal solution to these dangers for sex offenders' due
process rights: extending proportionality review, already applied to punitive
damages awards, to sex offender restrictions. Proportionality principles
should - and practically can - be applied to stem the tide of prejudicial and ill-
informed burdens imposed indiscriminately on all sex offenders.
ERIN MILLER
* Erin Miller is a 2013 graduate of Yale Law School.
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